The use of the Internet as a promotional tools in such communications.
Why this is important ?>
Should another human being be forced in to the condition which exist in war? Should then, as a result of one side lossing in this conflict, the victor occupys and then impose their will, either liberal democratic or authoritarian institutions upon this subsequent weaken society, along with its resulting failed economies as a result of lossing the war?
There are very clear known observations both recent and historic that both the application of democratic and authoritarin institutions by the victor have very mixed results. Why?
What are the key factors within human development and behavior which creates this condition of uncetainties?
Can the present efforts to bring liberal democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan be accoblished? " Very uncertain. " is the leading answer now - a - days. Yet with the development of Baghdad Night Life ( NightLife ), RMC a clear indication is that in order for change to occur there must be a cultural base in which to inspire new ideas from. That trust in these new ideas must have human resonance within the social and cultural behavior of the community under-going transformation by being directly 'linked ' to a local cultural base.
For Example in the Third Open Letter to the Iraqi Peoples.
Along with this oberservation, is how taking the high road for visability created immediate responses indicated the real emerging power of the Internet.
One Iraqi complained in an email. " Wheres the trust?" Meaning how can Iraqis can trust American when there are no direct links to local cultural institutions from which to begin to rebuild the Iraqi society. Nor in the view of more recent historic evidence by political aware sector of false promisses given to the internal oppossing Iraqi leadership before the American military conquest. " Wheres the trust."
From all the subsequent email, and other local, Ithaca, New York, communications the present sentiment, as of October, 2007 goes along theses lines.
Presenly though one thing that is now very clear is that to build trust both social, cultural, and spiritual institutions must be firmly established within the common cultural traits first. Then in the social and cultural transmission are then more easy to accept new idea, as it is likewise immediately understood that and institutions necessary for liberal democracy can never be manufactured with ease if at all possible in the first place.
What this has indicated, as this is the case, that in the absence of qualified social, cultural, and spiritual institutions, millions fled Iraq to other Arab states. Some of whom having a bathist authoritarian government. Yet additional evidence achieved through The Foundation " For " Arab - Reconciliation - Ithaca, New Yorknetwork, members in the immediate region who are now have Iraqi refugees have all noted the same factors for their presence.
This was, in part, imparted in various communications as a reaction to this being popular place within the Internet. Even the search engine, UAE, and Arab search engine had it placed within its nets.
Since Spring of 2003, this comment has been shared through-out the Middle East.
First the Palestinians, the second the Israelis, and finally, the Iraqi refugees.
"They did not want their children be subject to both physical and emotional harm by hate." Not they did want the senior members of their family be further age based vulnerability" According to the evidence, this group is better educated when compared to the normal regional model, and are the real middle class center of the Sunni Triangle of Urban Baghdad. They are the very people who made Iraqi work as it once did before the Americans. Right now their numbers is somewhere around 4,800,000.
Here where established institutions which did melt in the wake of America, and knew it was better to be in Kabul, the capital, than to leave. The development is marginal, and thiswas primarily due to economy which created wider and deeper dependence on the previous Soviet inspired institutions, and the even deeper emotional resentment felt by the educated on those relgious radicals who took over after Soviet influence was crushed.
In the meantime, American political discourse enter their lives right in the middle of the Afgani efforts to creat a life for themselves. Though this is less difficult within Kubul itself, its even harder everywhere else, but here comes American intervention.
President Bush paused to comment in his second-term Inaugural Address, "…it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." However, and what is now know is American ignorance of the central cultural values within this region.
Then came the rush of academians in their rush to publish. And soon the concerns of those who have to make a life for themselves in this region were lost in resulting American suffle of American political discourse in the approaching Presidential elections, academia throwing in their voice, and yet their is no voices being heard within either on a level playing field.
What has now occur is restoration efforts led by nonetheless, the Military institutions of the United States. Thus Baghdad, getting some marginal assurance of being safer, as it is, the very emotional element to commit to reconstruction is now one everyones mind within the region.
Then the interviews of some 840 Arab Students / Scholars within Western, New York and Ontario, Canada started to be comnfirmed in the present flow of communications. 1973 - 1982 - 1984 - 1992, 2001 - Cornell University.
The single perceptual mind set of the peoples of the Middle East comes from their fustration in attempting to discuss the anxieties on what Americans are trying to sell them in our form of Democratic institutions as the path for restoration and civilization success, when clearly implied saparation of Church and State are clearly and likewise defined. Both the previous interviews and the present attitude can be understood in their completely agreed view towards to American Civil Libertise Union. horror, and militant anger.
The American interjection, as it is now being looked at by the troops and the Iraqi, and Afgani Peoples have created an awareness by the peoples themselve that America is pushing fundamental shifts in the political, economic and social orders.
Largely without their consent too.
Feeling this American troops, as there are safety issues to reestablished crediable leaderships within the respested communities be invested in, are now starting the listen, and discovering at the sametime relative ignorance of existing institutions within this region, and it internal resources at leadership development.
It is here, American troops starting to listen, and thus learn about existing institutions where the actual Intercutural Communications is now being implemented. American generals have gone more" Generic in promotion democratic institutions within the region instead of selling the American role model. That redevelopment coordination must be in the hands of the populace based upon their own value systems.
This now runs contrary to what is being reflected in the emerging political discourse of the American Presidential electioneering, and the body politic of Amerian Aademia. This runs contrary to the beliefs, ideas and values systems of the people in Middle East in how to creat the conditions which would restore the present refugees back to their homes.
Both the prevailing attitude, and the internal emotional, and at time growing resentment centers on these four components.
At anytime in the present political discourse involved in the emerging Presidential and Congressional elections in 2008, and their public debates, when expressing an opionion on the future of the peoples within this region, they must be likewise be allowed for their own voice to be heard. On level playing field, and its clearly implied connection to ethics of consent and then democratic institution is represent is now before the Arabs, and their reflection of who is the United States.
The clear implications of advance technologies, and the Internet are the key components in which Middel East of Nations undertands as central needs to become self-dependent. Thus when one looks at Baghdad, the safest instillization are the micro-wave towers, as both those who build and destroy are similarily dependent upon their existance. Both needs equal access to Internet communications, as the technology hs become a conscious force in the immediate cognition of the peoples and leadership themselves.
The central core of Arab culture and society is a based upon the resulting institutions created as a result the social and cultural dependency upon the ethics of " FREE TRADE." Though things are still being clouded by the economic expectations and internal discourse of the wealth of " OIL " nonetheles, the existing economic institutions are the main concentration in the very fundementals of working and healthy Arab societies, or societies within this region. Every Arab fully realized this.
The primary factor why the central reason for the 840 Arab Students / Scholars presence at various academic institutions is integrate advance communcations in the efforts to promote central Arab values of trade and barter, integrating high technologies into Arab societies in order for the Arab nation to be self-dependent. The most important is developing positive experience and valued knowledge in how to communication with Americans as a whole.
The major complaint, however, comes from the preception that Americans have, and still have, towards the Arabs and Terrorism being linked. This was meant by complete resentment. And this revolves around the actual mode of operation within Arab society iself.
Why? Then comes the point.
Arab society clear revolves around the centality of developing the Community of the Arab Family. That each family is considered independent in how it carrys own the function of life for the benefit of its members. Outside intervention is considered criminal, and that the single effort which concerns its future well being is conducted through its various bridal selection processes.
To get a clear idea of the significance of this one first has to look or discover the news of an upcoming wedding to discover who is going to be the future leaders or wealthy business concerns.
It as form this perspective that a clear Arab view of themselves were likewise discovered. That there are those who are going to become equal to the society expection of earning a living within its economy of Free Trade, while there are those who do not have the ability to apply themselves-either as mature adults or who has the intellect to understand its workings. Thus their path is either through the Rifle, or The Koran, and as such are considered the peoples of the Alms.
Once the rule of the Riffle is installed, additional economic loss is likewise felt through out the Networks of the Community of the Arab Family.
Once the rule of The Koran is installed, business competiveness with other civilizations creates loss of economic self-dependency, while at the sametime Arab society incurs further technological disabilities. Though the Networks of the Community of the Arab Family fairs better under this rule instead the rule of Riffle, nonetheless, bridal selection is being intervined by Islamc clerics. As well as increased Alm before, present, and after a wedding.
The various form and networkings which goes on within each Arab family is the relevant discourse of concerns of everyone concern. However, from their view. " How come America does not understand this? Why are the only American who comming to terms with this are American troops, and not those who are engineering the American process of political discourse behind the upcoming Presidential and Congressional elections, when America prides itself in being a role model standard for democracy.
As this goes on, the impact of the technologies of the Internet are now allowing others within this region to have more contact among themselves, and new resources of informaion are revealing an emerging ethos, and central core of ideas.
It is here where one must stop and to bring in the Academic frame, or responsiabilties therein eachs pedgogy, Intercultural Communcations and the future singlularty and importance of International Students / Scholars presents within their campuses.
The International Students / Scholars on American Campuses. The academic pedgogy of recent modern times:
From this view point, as illustrated on Arab - Israeli Reconciliation site.
Internet Linkages. For Example, and from the same site.
There clear implications between links, link exchanges, webpage - website rankings, and greater public access within the Internet as the single most important media of today.
More importantly, this is how one is able to get a message out which will be read and understood. This is very basic to this Internet Paper - Thesis
Restoration efforts and the clear use of the Internet has created the new a fundamental change in the worldview by those within Middle East area of conflict. That in the technological applications of the media of the Internet restoration cannot achieve sel;f - dependency, economic or political wiithout any change be grounded in the culture of a society, or more importantly within the growing networks of the Community of The Arab Family. Members of each of the various existing family networks as the legitimate institutions from which change should undergo a process of careful examination first and foremost. This is in-keeping in making any future investments required for their long-run sustainability.
Internet and its function within Intercultural Communications has been applied by the following processes.
First the Orientation websites.
The central understanding is that the popularity of each webpage is dependent upon the interest of the user, and the ability of the webmaster to creat coalitions, the internet version of cultural democracy, to achieve page rankings. Here, and as result the Internet induction of each webpage is within this technology a voting booth.
The with this in minds is this.
Existing cultural dynamics within the Internet are especially effective as on - going social and cultural mechanisms of common knowledge the youth generation. They, as the each year the use of computers are tickling down to younger members of International society and their usage and products are embedded youth behavior itslef.
A point of integration within the pedagogy of academia: An Introduction.
This is at this point where various searched by Students / Scholars start to be attracted to new ideas.
Then to be campus slective.
Then a focus on the improvement of tbe social and cultural environment of America demands additional assets in assist International Students / Scholars. This is a tyupical resource page.
The International Students / Scholars are getting additional insight into the American societs and culture. Something they would have not have able to do until recently with this approach from their own host country.
It is here, and here alone, where the vital structure of cultural knowledge becomes an important elements ot improve conditions, but this is not the case in reverse in which American have a view of Arab society.
None exist in which America is able to understand, or unless they, we, are able to read Arabic. Then, and then only the previous statements starts to resonate within an intellegent response and in a form of query. What is there, lets say in Baghdad, which is a social, or cultural resouces. Right now, on the Internet, none. However, on the previous resource webpage several. And then the truth of things starts to emerge.
One: The internet is the cultural communications media of today. The growing systems of links, and forums which supports the publications of opinions creates to catalyst for change, as they are representive of existing culture. The importance of existing culture is paramount in any restoration of a society or peoples.
Intercultural Communications is a media in interactive and proactive within the very usage of the Internet. Then social and cultural programs are the living heart of Intercultural Communications by its implied proactive promotions of events. And thus we come to the growing International and National Cultural Fiesta Movemment.
As per sample webpage:
Though not completed, nonetheless, it imparts an activity in which its very organization create campus change. And thats the point. That when in comparision with what is going on with either shiite or sunni sectors in Iraq one can make more clearer judgements upon the single importance of supporting local cultural institutions which have already been integrated with the health a well being of the Networks of Community of Arab Family. Here is the crux, and that what is going on in the meantime, are the refugee vitalness to help reclaim the peace in Iraqi society, and to ensure its self - dependencies.
Then ideas spread social change involves coordinating individuals around established norms being enhanced by new technologiesm which in the internet ablity for self - discovery create in addition a new set of beliefs, ideas and positive expectations; the single nexus of youthful aspriations
Then, and only then can resistance occur in stark contrast those who follow the directives to coordinate on and engage in insurgency and terrorism. Once the objective is clearer then the willingness to resist clearly increases
What is now coming about is "common knowledge." The notion of common knowledge is the Internet's nature. Thus, the micro - wave tower in Baghdad lets say assume their real potentials.
Cultural products such as art, ceremonies, media, rituals and symbols all serve as concrete examples of sources of common knowledge. These mechanisms serve to generate common knowledge available for all to observe. As Clifford Geertz has indicated, culture is embodied in public symbols and members of a society communicate values through the use of those symbols (see Ortner 1984: 374-5 and Geertz 1964). As Petro notes, "Rituals, ceremonies, education, and the like provide ‘templates’ or ‘blueprints’ for the organization of social…processes" (2004: 110).
Given that a key part of establishing new political, economic and social movements are creating common knowledge around those new supporting concepts, and preprogramed cultural behavoirisms are critical for generating the necessary shift. The anthropologist, Victor Turner, has analyzed how individuals turn to their root paradigms for support during times of crisis (1974: 64). Turner contends that symbols and rituals are part of the social process that serves to overcome social contradictions and can also "instigate social action" (1967: 36). As such, cultural products must be recognized and incorporated into the reconstruction process.
The perceptual enveloped, and how the population which is directly being affected have in recorded human history gave rise and importance, therefore, the centrality of common knowledge. Common knowledge and individual perceptions by the society which is being directly impacted, both common knowlege and society's full cultural column defines all subsequent form of human interactions. This is how the judgement process is arrived in either consider construction, or reconstruction into a coordination actions to take; the developing a new situation. All of wwhich emerges either the traditional, new, or renewed status quo.However, when in the course of such interections, it is the statistical number as it approaches 27,000 [ as abserved ) of the affected society which there will come about individuals who will foresee the need for alternatives and more creative course of actions aand social coordinations. Thus to some extent has been understood by the assigned, or self-appointed leadership of society, and civillization. It is into this world of acknowledged realistic world, individuals will attempt to find cooperative solutions by coordinating with others either for or against alternative and more creative course in which socity should undertake. It is how common knowledge is defined which allows in the newly emerged dualism to commensurate a focal social process of eeither ratification or resistance and are able as a result of the significant numbers which supports the course of actions being considered.
Strength, which very often is furthered back by guns, and in more recent history atomic weapons common knwoledge and cultural practice can not qurantee either contruction ( such as in Iran ) or reconstruction ( such as in Irag and Afganistan ) will not not guarantee successful outcomes. Saddam Hussine was more than able to establish how Iragi Arab society was to function, establish common knowlege and cultural practive with the self acknowledgement of the affected Iragi citiznetry the realities of possible threats of tyerror on one whole family; the behavioral impact of which created anxiety ridden bad conjectures focal in responding to American and International troops on their soil. Transference of anxiety had occured in which the Presidency of George Bush in effect was directly mar by the Iraqi experience under the removed dictator Saddam Hussine. Commonalities in the interaction and how social and cultural actions is to be coordinated have both a direct impact upon all forms of human behavior. In the instance of the American and International involvements in Irag the programed preconditions state of personal Iraqi experiences common knowledge among citizens is what to follow and how then to act.
Unfortunately, and based upon oberservations the experience under Saddam Hussine common knowldege still has imprinted the common anxiety " wha if they failed to follow Saddam's directives, torture, firing squads, and hangingss their families would have to endure. Elements of the fleeing Revolutionary Guarde and those who released form criminal detentions fully understood the affect this had hold on the populations and thus implemented ethnic and sectarian as well as transference upon George Bush to fuel their visions of reconstruction of the Iraqi society which the American and International intrusions removeded; the population experience trauma then triggered a completely unexpected reaction - there was a mass flight out of Iraq. This in effect cancelled any future success for reconstructionalists, and for the those involved in the contruction of Iraqi society were likewise mnistified as well, but were directly relieved not having to confront an established civil war.
Presently and quite by the applied interanl pressures within the normal discourse of American society, the various movements who interjected to debate American continued interest in Iraq caused the American military to creatively find a means to establish parameters of what is common knowledge among the populations affected by their presences. Here InterCultural Communications were then employed, and the further discovery, and most remarkable fact that this triggeed lowering of causalities as a direct result. It is into the new socio - cultural and later on socio - economic environmental resultant which the key issue becomes discovering the best means, then for developing common knowledge around ideas, beliefs and conjectures aligning with liberal democratic political, social and economic orders which are not of American origins.
InterCultrual Communications and the new intuision created by first the American military, then later by the State Department the new methodologies were slowly replacing the vacume left by the ouster of Saddma Hussine. Both the reconstructionalist and contructionalist of Iraaqi society InterCultrual Communications became the new common knowledge as a direct result of daily communications with the American military though the presence of which still be affected by the conditional behaviorism impacted by the regime of Saddam Hussine.<------------editing below------------->
Intuitively, many of the same mechanisms which generated common knowledge in the pre-conflict period will also be effective in the post-conflict setting. The reasoning here is straightforward. Existing indigenous mechanisms are embedded in the culture of the conflict-torn society and will be perceived as legitimate. As such, they will be more effective than those imposed exogenously. As we will see, indigenous mechanisms serve as a constraint on the efforts of occupying forces. When they exist, identifying, maintaining and incorporating indigenously established cultural products as a means of developing common knowledge can greatly assist the reconstruction process.
The cultural mechanisms that transfer common knowledge will differ from place to place depending on many issues, including the pre-conflict level of development and the specific culture of the conflict-torn society. By focusing on the nature of common knowledge in Germany and Japan – considered by many to be cases of successful reconstruction – we accomplish two things. First, these case studies illuminate the theoretical claims put forth above. Second, the analysis contributes to our understanding of the success of reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan relative to other reconstruction efforts. While many studies focus on the role of military force in these reconstruction efforts, this study contributes to understanding the cultural aspects of the reconstructions.
3. Common Knowledge in the Reconstruction of Germany and Japan
One finds historical support for the importance of cultural products and common knowledge in previous successful reconstruction efforts. Specifically, the role of cinema and media in post-conflict Germany and Japan illustrates the importance of common knowledge in the reconstruction process. There are three key indicators that establish German and Japanese cinema and media as effective common knowledge generation mechanisms in both pre and post-conflict periods.
Cinema and media were well-established mediums of information and entertainment dissemination. These cultural products had a long history in each country and were embedded in the indigenous culture prior to the arrival of occupiers.
The second indicator is attendance and circulation figures. Although reliable statistics are sporadic, those available show attendance and circulation generally increasing over time, implying an increase in consumer demand as well as the reach of information.The amount of resources invested by those in positions of political power to influence and control these industries. These individuals, seeking to shape and influence the underlying worldview of the countries continually sought to control these industries to influence the nature of common knowledge generated.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of the historical occurrences in Japan and Germany, this analysis also provides insight into the role of common knowledge for current and future reconstruction efforts. Admittedly, the histories of both the cinema and media in Germany and Japan are complex and this paper does not cover all the related intricacies. The following discussion is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. The aim is to establish cinema and media as deeply embedded cultural products in Germany and Japan and to understand the role they played in social change in the post-World War II period.
3.1 Cinema in Germany
German cinema can be traced to the early twentieth century, beginning with showings in the back rooms of pubs and shops, as well as at traveling fairs and circuses. The popularity of film quickly spread and the showings shifted from such informal accommodations to dedicated theaters. By 1910, there were an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 theaters in Germany with 350 concentrated in Berlin. The rapid expansion of the film industry meant that even in its early years, cinema served as a source of common knowledge among the populace. The largest cinemas seated up to 1,000 customers. As of World War I, one-third of the population attended the cinema each week. By 1914, the cinema had become a reliable source of news, international fashion and consumer trends (Fehrenbach 1995: 14, 16).
The effectiveness of cinema as a means of generating common knowledge is evident in the responses of intellectuals and state officials. We would only expect these individuals to exert effort criticizing the cinema if it was indeed reaching a large number of people. As it turns out, the extensive popularity of the cinema met great resistance from both cultural elites and government officials. In a 1912 memo, the Prussian minister of culture compared popular cinema to "trashy pulp fiction and pornography" and postulated that cinema was having a negative impact on the young, "eroding…their ability to contemplate great works of art" (quoted in Stark 1982: 132). His comments exemplify the typical response of state officials to the success of cinema. Whatever the motivations of these critics, one thing is clear - the cinema had reached a level of development where it could shape and influence cultural norms and was viewed as a threat to the status quo.
To further understand the impact of cinema, one can also consider the reforms promoted by critics. These efforts called for state intervention to regulate those aspects of the cinema industry perceived as "negative." After much lobbying for nationalized standards, the German courts determined that film control should remain a largely local issue. Within these guidelines, influenced by the intellectual elite and state officials, the individual states created film control offices in their state capitals. The rules varied from state to state. Some required adults to accompany younger viewers to movies; others censored content (Fehrenbach 1995: 19-21; Hake 2002: 22).
These efforts did have some effect as filmmakers, attempting to make their films more "respectable," shifted their target audience from the working-class to the mainstream. As the German film historian, Heide Fehrenbach, notes, the filmmaking culture was "transformed, liberated from its restricted, class based exhibition space to forge a ‘universalized, homogenized mass culture’" (1995: 22). In fact, beginning in 1913, more and more newspapers began dedicating space to film reviews and criticism, further illustrating mainstream acceptance of cinema (see Wollenberg 1972: 10 and Hake 1993).
In sum, there were two major occurrences related to German cinema in the pre-World War I period. The first was the development and expansion of the industry. The second was state intervention in the industry, prompted by state officials and critics who realized the ability of cinema to affect common knowledge in a manner they did not desire. Both of these trends would continue for the next several decades.
World War I led to a decisive change in state intervention in the cinema industry. There was less concern with the moral aspect of films. Instead, state officials wanted to use the cinema to increase nationalism. In a 1917 memo to the War Ministry, General Ludendorff, an officer in Germany’s high command, implicitly confirmed cinema as a powerful generator of common knowledge when he wrote: "Our victory absolutely depends on using films to exert the greatest possible persuasion wherever people can still be won over to the German cause" (quoted in Stark 1982: 161-2).
As a result of this realization by state officials of the potential for cinema to create a common and widespread support for the war, the Photo and Film Office was created in 1917. This office was responsible for developing and producing newsreels on the war effort, which were distributed both at home and abroad. The Photo and Film Office also established nine hundred "soldier cinemas." The aim of the soldier cinemas was to promote viewings by the members of the army on the western and eastern fronts (Fehrenbach 1995: 19-21; Stark 1982: 161-2). A large part of this propaganda movement relied on stories and images – some true, others fictitious – to evoke emotion from the viewer in support of the German cause (Hake 2002: 23).
One difficulty for German state officials was the small percentage of domestic films that made up the total German film market. In 1914, films produced domestically represented only 15% of the total German film market. In contrast, French productions represented 30% of the market, American films claimed 25% and Italian films held 20% of the total market (Fehrenbach 1995: 24). This presented a problem because the government could not directly control the content of foreign films. Initially, at the outset of World War I, officials banned foreign movies covering certain topics such as espionage or treason. By 1915, the regulations had become much stricter and all foreign films were banned.
It is important to realize the extent to which the state controlled all aspects of the film industry and attempted to maintain the popularity of the medium. Government leaders insisted that propaganda films be well written and technically adept. Further, every half hour of "enlightenment" was followed by a half hour of "harmless entertainment" to avoid overkill of the propaganda message (Fehrenbach 1995: 26). Plans for a privately owned but government "influenced" film company ceased with the end of the war in 1918.
With the conclusion of the war, Germany’s film industry expanded rapidly. The number of film production companies increased from 11 in 1911 to 131 in 1918, and the number of cinemas increased from approximately 2,300 in 1918 to 5,078 in 1929. Internationally, Germany ranked third in 1927 with 241 films as compared to 742 in the U.S., 407 in Japan, 141 in Russia and 74 in France (Fehrenbach 1995: 27; Hake 2002: 47; Wollenberg 1972: 11-17, 24, 37). The removal of the stringent film laws enacted prior to World War I was partly responsible for this expansion. The new republican constitution allowed for freedom of speech and the removal of censorship laws. The result was a drastic increase in the production of domestic films.
As in the prewar period, critics feared that cinema was causing the morals and culture of the German populace to erode. In May 1920, under the building pressure of critics, a censorship law (Reichlichtspielgesetz) was passed requiring that two film boards review all films prior to public distribution. As part of this law, the film industry was again opened to foreign films, although these films also had to be reviewed.
In the 1920s, Hollywood films constituted one-third of all feature films shown in Germany. American films and culture became popular among a large portion of the German population and were viewed positively by many critics as well. There is a relevant connection to be drawn here between the German experience with American culture and film in this period and the Allied occupation some twenty plus years later that aimed to permanently impose many of these views. American values and culture was not alien to many Germans and, to some extent, the German culture in the pre-Nazi period had absorbed many of these values communicated to them through American films.
Despite lobbying on the part of critics and officials to increase censorship, the German cinema industry continued to develop. By 1933, German films dominated the domestic market, and a national cinema industry and identity was well established (Fehrenbach 1995: 41). The period of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) was a critical time in the development of the cinema. Many of the stringent laws and regulations imposed during World War I were lifted. Of course relaxing these laws did not mean that the opposition to the film industry – both domestic and foreign – was eased. The opposition to a deregulated market in film would continue until Hitler’s rise to power.
Upon Hitler’s rise to chancellor in 1933, he named Joseph Goebbels the head of the newly formed Ministry for Public Enlightenment. The amount of effort and resources dedicated to controlling film, radio and press by this Ministry is staggering. In July 1933, Goebbels established the Reich Film Chamber responsible for reviewing all film treatments, production personnel and final film productions before release. A formal censorship law, passed in 1934, mandated that each film receive a grade determined by their political, artistic and educational value. In 1935, screen licenses for all films made prior to 1933 were revoked. Despite these regulations, the German film industry produced 1,000 films between 1933 and 1945. As Hake points out: "These numbers suggest…that films were considered an important part of everyday life, propagating National Socialist ideas…along the lines defined by the regime" (2002: 59).Although the film industry was not officially nationalized until 1942, the Nazis had great influence over the entire industry. Perhaps the greatest instrument of control was the Nazi operated Filmkreditbank, which provided credit to German film producers. By 1935, Filmkreditbank had financed approximately 70% of all German films (Fehrenbach 1995: 43; Hake 2002: 63). By 1942, the Nazi regime controlled over 8,400 cinemas across Europe, and their films reached over 1 billion total viewers (Fehrenbach 1995: 43; Welch 1983: 12-14; Wollenberg 1972: 36-8). This translates into 13.8 viewings per person for the year. Other notable aspects of the Nazi propaganda program were the Filmvolkstag (People’s Film Day) and the Youth Film Hours. On those days deemed "People’s Film Day," viewers could attend cinemas at discounted rates. Youth Film Hours targeted children and reached 11 million youth viewers in the 1942-3 year. The Nazi controlled German film industry was successful. In 1933, 245 million tickets (3.7 per German citizen) were sold, in 1936 the number rose to 362 million (5.4 per German citizen) and in 1938 a total of 440 million tickets (6.5 per German citizen) were sold (Hake 2001: 72; 2002: 64-5).
It is important to note that, despite Nazi censorship laws, American films were still shown in Germany through 1940 and film magazines at this time provided articles on such Hollywood stars as Katharine Hepburn, Myrna Loy, Claudette Colbert and Gary Cooper. Berlin cinemas ran week-long special programs focusing on these same actors. The presence of American films in the 1920s and 1930s provided Germans with a view of the world beyond Germany, and this exposure to American cinema planted the seeds of western culture.
In the immediate post-WWII period, the four powers that occupied Germany realized the central role that mass media – print, radio and film – played in German society. The military seized these industries as well as the complementary industries that supported them. Production in these industries was suspended. Initially, the U.S. Information Control Division (ICD) released films aimed at reeducation, with topics including Nazi death camps (Todesmühlen (Death Mills), 1945), other Nazi atrocities and war tribunals. Many of these films and documentaries were mandatory and Germans were required to have their ration cards stamped at the theater (Fehrenbach 1995: 55-6, Hake 2002: 87-8).
The U.S. plan for the cinema industry required complete restructuring because it was ultimately to be based on open markets and competition without state control. In July of 1945, the occupying forces allowed twenty theaters to open. Soon thereafter, a policy of opening 250 cinemas per month in the U.S. zone began. The films shown were imports from Hollywood that conveyed messages of the American life and democratic institutions (Hake 2002: 88).,p>In November of 1945, the production of domestic German films resumed. Domestic producers were required to get licensing from the ICD. In order to receive a license, films were required to communicate a message consistent with the end goals of reconstruction. The licensing process was slow, as the ICD reviewed the background of those involved in the filmmaking process – producers, directors, actors, etc. Due to competition for film-related resources from the Soviet zone, a new program for encouraging native film production and making the film industry self-sustaining was undertaken in July of 1946. These programs were critical in allowing indigenous agents to be involved in the film making process to utilize their knowledge of German culture. Film attendance increased throughout the occupation. In 1946, total attendance was 300 million, or 4.4 films per citizen, and in 1947 it was 459.6 million or 6.8 films per citizen.
With the creation of Bizonia (the merger of the U.S. and Great Britain zones) in January of 1947 and the extension of the Marshall Plan to all the Western zones of Germany in 1948, the three occupying nations had to reach an agreement on the policy for the film industry. After a series of negotiations, the three occupying powers agreed to a model very much in line with the original goals of the U.S.
Around the same time, negotiations began with those in the film industry. A film producers’ association was created and the preliminary aspects of a voluntary censorship code were developed by the film industry in 1949 under the umbrella trade organization the Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft e.V. (SPIO). In mid-July of 1949, occupation laws were lifted and the self-sustaining German film industry began (Fehrenbach 1995: 58-63).
Throughout the rest of the occupation, German film would play a key role in developing common knowledge among the populace. This knowledge was important in achieving both the immediate goals of reconstruction and the longer-term goals of establishing an independent culture and national identity. As Hake writes: "In the Western zone, the cinema after 1945 emerged as the driving force behind the ongoing self-transformation of postwar culture and society" (Hake 2002: 104).
In 1948, 443 million Germans (6.6 films per citizen) attended the movies and in 1949 attendance increased to 467.2 (6.9 films per citizen). The postwar films served to create common knowledge around the new political and social order as well as giving those reconstructed orders widespread legitimacy. These films also helped define the break from Germany’s past. Films dealt with a wide range of topics from anti-Semitism – Affäre Blum (The Blum Affair, 1948), Morituri (1948) and Der Ruf (The Appointment, 1949) – to pacifism – Die Brücke (The Bridge, 1959) – to military life – Hunde, wollt ihr ewig leben (Dogs, Do you Want to Live Forever, 1959) – to the role of women in society – Die Sünderin (The Sinner, 1951), Mädchen hinter Gittern (Girl Behind Bars, 1949), Liebe kann wie Giftsein (Love Can Be Like Poison, 1958) and Anders als du und ich (Different From You and Me, 1957).
The U.S occupation forces, by identifying and maintaining an indigenous cultural product eased the process of generating common knowledge and hence coordination. The cinema had a well-established history and was well embedded in the lives of German citizens both before and after World War II. In the Western zone, 3,000 theaters were operating by 1950 (up from 1,000 in 1945), with an attendance of 487.4 million (7.1 films per citizen). In 1951, attendance increased to 554.8 million (8.1 films per citizen) and in 1952 it reached 614.5 million (8.88 films per citizen). An attendance record was reached in 1956 with total attendance at 817.5 million (11.6 films per citizen).
3.2 Media in Germany
The history of media in Germany can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Censorship, political control and the fragmentation of German states prevented the printed media from developing on a larger scale until the mid-1850s. The boom in mass media in the late nineteenth century has been attributed to German unification, increased literacy, and advances in technology resulting in lower costs (Humphreys 1990: 13-4).
In 1874, Bismarck’s government enacted the Reichspressegestez (Imperial Press Law). The Reichspressegestez created a national press law and removed some censorship laws and state licensing requirements. However, media policy under Bismarck was hardly liberal. For example, an "Anti-Socialist Law," which banned the publication of socialist ideas, was enacted in 1878. This law, which was lifted in 1890, illustrates that, while censorship laws were eased under Bismarck, they were far from absent. The important point is that under Bismarck, media in Germany started to develop into a commercial industry. Increased circulation led to increased advertising, and it provided a solid foundation of funding for the publishers (Humphreys 1990: 14-5; Sanford 1976: 10).
During the Weimar Republic, from 1918 to 1933, the media continued to develop newspapers that supported different political and religious viewpoints. In 1920, approximately 600 papers supported the Catholic Center Party. The socialist and communist press, supporting the Social Democrats, produced approximately 200 papers (Humphreys 1990: 16). In order to gain market share and meet consumer demand, news coverage by these papers expanded. For instance, the Social Democrats found that they could broaden their customer base by including sports, photos, entertainment and business sections in their publications.
Radio also became an established means of communication under the Weimar Republic. Radio had been used within the government during World War I and commenced broadcasting on a national scale in the 1920s. As such, the advent of broadcasting in Germany was mainly government driven, but the Weimar Constitution did not address broadcasting. As a result it was governed by a complex set of state regulations and contracts between the central and regional governments. Throughout the Weimar period, radio was viewed more suitably as a tool of public administration rather than a commercial industry (Humphreys 1990: 125-6). Despite state control of radio, it was a well-established means of common knowledge generation.
In addition to the diversity of media coverage, another characteristic of the Weimar period was the consolidation and concentration of the media industry. Alfred Hugenberg, a staunch conservative industrialist, created the first German multimedia empire. Hugenberg’s influence and operations were vast and included an advertising firm, Ala, which controlled a large share of the commercial advertising market, various news agencies, a syndicate, Wipro, which supplied news and information to other press agencies and a cinema news company, Wochenschau-Produktion Deauligfilm. Hugenberg’s media outlets had a large political and cultural influence, and he willingly used his control over various media outlets for political ends. From 1920 onwards, he was a leading figure in the extreme right-wing nationalist German National People’s Party. In the early 1930s, Hugenberg and the German National People’s Party supported Hitler. They were a major reason for his control of a parliamentary majority, resulting in his eventual election as chancellor in January of 1933.
The Nazi regime effectively used the press as a mechanism for the dispersion of propaganda. This becomes clear when considering the change in circulation of Nazi publications over time. In 1927, there were three Nazi daily newspapers with a total daily subscription of 17,800 (.3 per 1,000 citizens). By 1929, the number of dailies had increased to ten with an increased circulation of 72,590 (1.1 per 1,000 citizens). In 1930, there were nineteen dailies with a circulation of 253,925 (3.9 per 1,000 citizens), and there were 59 dailies with a circulation of 782,121 (11.9 per 1,000 citizens) by 1932. After the Nazi regime assumed power in 1933, one observes a significant increase in both the number of daily publications and circulation. In 1934, there were approximately 97 daily Nazi newspapers with a circulation of 3.4 million (50.8 per 1,000 citizens). By 1939, these numbers had doubled to a daily circulation over six million (97 per 1,000 citizens) (Hale 1964: 59).
As with the German cinema, the German media was an effective mechanism for developing and disseminating common knowledge. The resources used by the Nazi’s to control the industry illustrate this. Soon after assuming power in 1933, the Nazis enacted the "Emergency Decree for the Protection of State and Nation" which laid the foundation for state control of the media. This decree defined specific requirements for journalists, and it placed controls on the work of editors and journalists. "The Reich Press Law" of October 4, 1933, identified journalism as a "public vocation" and further specified the requirements for this career. With these new regulations, editors and journalists became tools of the state (Hale 1964: 83; Humphreys 1990: 21-2; Shirer 1960: 245).
The previously discussed Ministry for Public Enlightenment, under the direction of Joseph Goebbels, impacted German media as well as German cinema. In addition to cinema, the Ministry controlled the radio, press, theater, literature and advertising. Initially, the Nazi regime did not seize control of all media outlets. Instead of direct control, a form of indirect control via the Ministry was established in the form of "partnerships" between these independent papers and the Nazi papers. Each morning the editors of the daily newspapers in Berlin would meet at the Ministry. Here, Goebbels or his aides would tell the editors what news was to be reported and which news events were not to be reported. He also specified appropriate editorial topics. In addition to this physical meeting, written directives were issued. For newspapers published outside Berlin, this directive was sent via telegram (Shirer 1960: 245).
The Nazis also closely controlled radio. In fact, radio was at the center of Goebbels’ program of shaping public opinion. The radio was used to disseminate the various pronouncements and achievements of the regime. As with print media, specific guidelines were established. The guidelines defined who could participate in broadcasting (Humphreys 1990: 124-128; Sanford 1976: 67-70; Shirer 1960: 247-8). To understand the reach of radio in Germany, consider that between May of 1932 and May of 1939, the number of listeners more than tripled from 4.17 million to 12.5 million (Uricchio 1992: 192, fn 6).
With the onset of World War II, the Nazi state strengthened its control of the media to an even greater extent. Private newspapers, which were deemed a potential threat, were closed. By 1943, approximately 1,000 publishers had been shut down by the Nazi regime. Others, although not closed, were either purchased or confiscated via force and incorporated into the state-run media network. By 1945, approximately 82.5% of the total circulation capacity in Germany was under Nazi control (Humphreys 1990: 23).
As with the cinema, the Allied forces realized the importance of media – both print and broadcast - in the lives of Germans. On November 24, 1944, the Allied forces drafted a detailed plan for taking over control of the press and broadcasting industries following Germany’s surrender. Under Law No. 191, issued on May 12, 1945, all public communication was banned. Every broadcast, publication or performance had to be approved and licensed by the occupation forces. While the licensing process was organized, the occupying forces issued their own newspapers in their respective zones – the Neue Zeitung (the U.S. zone), Die Welt (British zone), the Nouvelles de France (French zone) and the Tägliche Rundschau (Soviet zone). The U.S. also created a decentralized broadcasting structure with several broadcasting stations in their zone, including Radio Breman, Radio Frankfurt (which later became Hessischer Rundfunk), Radio Stuttgart (which later became South German Broadcasting Service, (Süddeutscher Rundfunk ) and Radio Munich (Radio München). The British developed a single corporation – the North West German Broadcasting Service (Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk) for their zone as did the French – the South West German Broadcasting Service (Südwestdeutscher Rundfunk), which was later renamed South West Broadcasters (Südwestfunk).
The end goals of the Allied occupation regarding the print media and broadcasting media were fundamentally different. Initially, the broadcasting system was to be based on the British model of public service broadcasting under which broadcasting organizations were neither privately nor publicly held, but rather were "public service" bodies or corporations under public law. After discussion and compromises between the Allied forces, a regional, decentralized system was developed. By contrast, at the outset of the occupation, the ultimate goal of print media policy was the return of the press to complete private ownership via an Allied run and controlled licensing process (Humphreys 1990: 26-7, 128-9).
The license process involved careful screening by the Allied forces of the end goals of those to be involved in the media endeavor. Only those deemed to be committed to democratic ideals were granted licenses and there was continued oversight of the licensed activities. Between July 1945 and September 1949, a total of 169 papers were licensed in Germany, 58 of which were in the U.S. zone (Humphreys 1990: 36). The newspaper in the U.S. zone employed German journalists and German speaking émigrés who understood German culture and how to communicate the U.S. message to the German populace.
In her comprehensive historical analysis of the Neue Zeitung, Gienow-Hect (1999) advances a thesis countering the common argument of cultural imperialism on the part of the U.S. She argues that the employment of indigenous actors (i.e., German journalists) in the U.S. zone created a paper that played a key role in the successful reconstruction. This is due to the fact that German journalists served as the most effective transmitters of the desired message given their understanding of the German culture. A similar approach was taken in broadcasting. By the end of 1947, all stations except the North West German Broadcasting Service in Britain’s zone were under the supervision and operation of "reliable and Anti-Fascist" German journalists (Humphreys 1990: 131).
With the defeat of the Nazi regime, the goals of the occupying forces included reeducation and democratization. The media was a key generator of common knowledge around a new set of beliefs, ideas and conjectures. It also required that these mechanisms eventually be turned over completely to indigenous actors if the end goal of a self-sustaining order was to be achieved. As the process of reconstruction took place and new political and social institutions began to evolve, the strict licensing regulations were slowly removed in a series of laws through 1949.
On September 21, 1949, Law No.5 Concerning the Press, Broadcasting, and Other Organs of Reporting and Entertainment were enacted. This law enabled every German citizen who was not identified as a threat to produce any publication or article without the approval of the occupying forces. The first post-WWII German paper published by Germans was the Frankfurter Rundschau, a bi-weekly of four pages with an initial circulation of a half million. As Julian Bach, a media correspondent who experienced the occupation in person wrote: "it is something more than just a bi-weekly dispenser of news…it is a symbol…it represents their first taste of news, printed openly by Germans in Germany and untainted by Nazi propaganda…"(1946: 221-3). The number of papers in the U.S. zone quickly increased from 187 in September 1949, when licensing was still in effect, to 527 by the end of 1949 with a total circulation of approximately 4.6 million (67.57 per 1,000 citizens) (Humphreys 1990: 41). The process of turning over complete control of the means of common knowledge dissemination to indigenous and private individuals had begun.
3.3 Cinema in Japan
The advent of film in Japan can be traced back to 1896 with the development of the Edison Kinetoscope. A little over a year later, projectors were introduced, which allowed films to be shown on a screen. Newsreels were first produced in 1900 and in 1903, the first theater devoted entirely to film was constructed in Tokyo. In 1912, the first major film company, Nikkatsu, was established. This marked the beginning of mass production by the Japanese film industry. Film was aimed at entertaining the masses and drew on traditional drama and literature for material, especially from kabuki (traditional theater) and kodan (historical tales). Even in its earliest stages of development, the Japanese cinema reached several classes within the general populace. Showings in Tokyo offered seating sections for the "upper-class," "middle class" and general admission. Students and military personnel were charged half price for tickets. By 1926, film attendance in Japan totaled 153.7 million people (2.5 films per citizen) (Anderson and Richie 1982: 22; High 1984; Kasza 1993: 54; Sato 1982: 7).
Government censorship impacted the cinema industry from its beginnings. In the early period of Japanese cinema, any image that reflected badly on the royal family was banned. In 1908, a French film entitled The Reign of Louis XVI (Le Règn de Louis XVI) was banned because of a scene in which citizens attacked the royal palace. The Film Control Regulations (Eiga torishimari kisoku) were adopted in 1917 and enforced by the local governments of the Home Ministry until 1925. These regulations were enforced largely through business licensing at the local level.
Over time, film laws shifted from decentralized control to more centralized control. In 1925, the first national censorship law – Censorship Regulation of Moving Pictures – was enacted. This law required domestic films, along with "explanatory scripts," to be submitted for government approval. Films believed to "desecrate" the imperial family, or "harm the dignity" of the nation could be censored. An important part of this law was that it deemed films to be "entertainment" rather than "speech" or "publication". This allowed the Home Ministry to circumvent the constitution, which allowed for free speech. Although the Home Ministry controlled the regulation of the film industry, it consulted often with the military and Ministry of Education for input on which films were acceptable.
Even with the new law, the production of films was still high – 15,348 films were inspected in 1926; 16,101 were inspected in 1927; 18,893 were inspected in 1929 and 18,436 were inspected in 1932 (Kasza 1993: 54, 59). The national film policy was paternalistic in nature, and it sought to shape the moral, political and social views of the populace. Reviewing films against a strict set of guidelines allowed the government to filter the content of the films viewed by the Japanese people. The fact that the government exerted resources reviewing each and every film against a strict set of guidelines supports the claim that the cinema was an established means of developing common knowledge among the Japanese populace.
In 1935, the Japanese government imposed import restrictions on foreign films. Foreign films, including American films, were still shown but were reviewed for content and censored prior to being shown in theaters. In 1941, after Pearl Harbor, all American films were banned from entering Japan and those already in the country were confiscated. While American films were quickly removed from the Japanese mainstream, the populace had exposure to American culture and film in the pre-1941 period. The exposure of the Japanese populace to American culture was significant given that western culture and institutions were not alien to the Japanese populace.
The 1925 national Film Law was superseded in 1939 with a more comprehensive film law. Under this law, all producers, distributors and theater operators had to be licensed by the government. In addition, the law encouraged and required showings of films "useful to the national education" (Hirano 1992: 13-6). As of 1940, the total number of theaters in Japan was 2,363 and film attendance in Japan totaled 440 million people, the equivalent of 6.1 films per citizen (Freiburg, 1987; Kasza 1988: 232).
In 1942, the government established the Film Corporation to monopolize the government distribution and showing of films. From this time through the American occupation in 1945, the military aspects of Japanese film became the main focus of censorship. Any scene that was deemed to suggest anti-war sentiments was removed. For instance, the families of soldiers leaving for war had to be presented as proud with no hint of sadness; scenes portraying the enemies in a positive light were also removed. Western music and scenes with birthday parties were removed because they were considered to be "Anglo-American." As in Germany, the Home Ministry set aside one day a month where admission was free to certain members of the general populace. In 1940, the Office of Public Information was created. This signaled a policy shift away from the prevention of negative themes to the promotion of definite themes for movies. Specifically, the Office of Public Information created a list of approved "national-policy themes" that filmmakers were to follow (Anderson and Richie 1982: 129-134; Hirano 1992: 24-5).
Prior to Japan’s surrender, the United States spent a great deal of time studying and developing plans for the Japanese cinema. This further confirms the cinema’s importance in the generation of common knowledge. For example, The Department of War invested great resources in studying Japanese films in order to understand the culture. One of the resulting reports, "Japanese Films: A Psychological Warfare," produced by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Management, analyzed the various aspects of twentieth century Japanese films – specifically, the underlying themes and cinematic techniques. The report concluded that Japanese films were effective as a means of disseminating "nationally controlled propaganda" (Hirano 1992: 25-6). In short, the analysis by the U.S., which took place prior to the war’s conclusion, indicated the critical role that cinema would play in the postwar situation in both eliminating "militaristic ideology" and disseminating democratic ideas (Hirano 1992: 127, Dower 1999: 75).At the conclusion of World War II, film – and more generally mass media – became a major part of the reconstruction efforts of the U.S. occupying forces. The occupying forces quickly took control of the industry and assigned responsibility to the Information Dissemination Section (IDS) - which would later become the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) - and the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). The goal was to expedite the process of establishing a society with free speech and religious worship as well as to disseminate democratic ideals and principles.
For the first week after the occupation, the theaters were closed. Soon thereafter a government directive was issued calling for the opening of theaters showing approved films. The occupying forces called a two-day meeting of the top Japanese film executives, producers, directors and wartime film bureaucrats from September 20-22, 1945 at the IDS. Here, key members of the Japanese film industry were told that the occupying forces wanted their assistance in reconstructing Japan in a positive manner. They reviewed a list of desirable subjects and topics that were consistent with the aims of the reconstruction. The occupying forces realized that working with indigenous agents who had a deep understanding of both the Japanese film industry and culture was central to achieving success.
The occupying government lifted the strict Film Law on October 16, 1945 and issued directives calling for freedom of speech and press. The occupying forces also implemented its own system of censorship through the CIE. In addition to CIE censorship, the procedures included a review of all films by military censors. These directives declared that the Film Corporation would cease operations in December so that a self-sustaining, competitive film industry could develop. Each film company had a distinct liaison section established to interact with the censors to ensure that films met the occupation guidelines.
Although these directives placed clear limits on what Japanese filmmakers could produce, films covering a wide range of topics were released. Topics covered included wartime militarism – Machi no ninkimono (Popular Man in Town, 1946) and Inochi aur kagiri (As Long as I Live, 1946), women’s liberation – Hatachi no seishun (Twenty-Year-Old Youth, 1946) and sexual expression – Aruyo no seppun (Certain Night’s Kiss, 1946) and Yoru no onna-tachi (Women of the Night, 1948) (Hirano 1992: 148-175). The occupying forces clearly respected the opinions of the Japanese filmmakers at this time. While they enforced the directives regarding the cinema, the occupying forces gave filmmakers the opportunity to re-write and submit multiple versions of scripts and discuss issues with censors. This process, while not free from censorship, allowed ample room for the opinion and influence of indigenous agents from the film industry. This enabled the development of a self-sustaining industry which would continue with the end of the occupation in 1952.
The double censorship – CIE and military – ended in June of 1949 with the establishment of the Film Ethics Regulation Control Committee. The Committee was established as an entity to deal with censorship that was independent of both American and Japanese political bodies. At the same time, pre-production approval was ended. While strict censorship was removed, final CIE approval on all finished films was still required through the end of the official occupation on April 28, 1952.
As this subsection suggests, Japanese cinema clearly played an important role in the reconstruction of Japan. Despite the film laws established throughout the occupation, approximately 1,000 films were made in Japan between September 1945 and April 1952 (Hirano 1992: 11; Dower 1999: 426). To put this number in its proper context, it must be remembered that in addition to the occupation film laws, there was also physical destruction from the war itself. This destruction clearly affected the operation of the film industry. Nonetheless, the occupying forces maintained an indigenous cultural product for common knowledge development to assist in the coordination of the populace around the aims of the reconstruction. Moreover, they included the indigenous agents – producers, directors and executives – making the cinema even more effective in achieving their goals of a self-sustaining national identity and social order.
3.4 Media in Japan
The earliest newspapers in Japan appeared in the 1860s. These papers served mainly to convey information regarding commerce. By the late 1860s, the Chūgai Shinbun had an unprecedented daily circulation of 1,500 (De Lange: 1998: 28). By the turn of the century, Japan’s press was developing rapidly. Papers began publishing information about foreign countries, including Britain, the United States and Russia as well as stories and news translated from foreign newspapers. Even in its earliest development, the press was recognized by the government as a means of disseminating common knowledge. A letter from the Meji government in 1871 to the publishers of newspapers stated, "Newspaper publishers should make it their purpose to develop the knowledge of the people" (De Lange 199: 34). During rebellions in 1876 and 1877, the government instituted emergency police controls over all reporting.
By the early 1900s, the popularity of newspapers in Japan had increased dramatically. Between 1894 and 1904 the daily circulation of the Hōchi Shinbun had doubled to 40,000. The daily circulation of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun had increased from 20,000 to 75,000 and the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun had reached a daily circulation of 90,000. The top selling national paper, the Yorozu Chōhō, had a daily circulation of over 140,000 (3 per 1,000 citizens) (De Lange: 1998: 93).
The media was a critical means for the development and transmission of information in Japan’s wars with China and Russia. In 1894, the public had rallied behind the government’s war effort against China, and the media supplied their demand for information. Approximately 130 reporters from more than sixty newspapers accompanied Japanese troops and reported their experiences (De Lange 1998: 109). Ten years later, the press served as the main avenue for public discourse on the Russo-Japanese War. In the prewar period, different papers took various stances ranging from a clearly pro-war stance (Osaka Asahi Shinbun, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun and the Jihi Shinpō) to pacifism (Mainichi Shinbun and Yorozu Chōhō). As public opinion shifted in support of the war, most papers followed suit and rallied behind the war effort.
In both wars, the government enacted censorship laws to monitor the press. The close monitoring of the press would remain in effect until the U.S. occupation. The Japanese government’s goal was to utilize the media in coordinating the populace around the war efforts. As considered above, the resources invested by the government serve to confirm the influence of Japanese media as an effective mechanism of common knowledge generation.
Despite the limits on expression, the press continued to remain popular among the Japanese populace. By the mid 1920s, major daily newspapers with nation-wide distribution had combined circulation of between 1 and 1.5 million, or between 16.7 and 25.1 per 1,000 people (Hanazono 1934: 93; Hane 2001: 240, Kasza 1993: 28). In the late 1930s, the Japanese government centralized the press by passing a law that allowed it to control financial and material resources, prices and labor. This empowered the government to centralize the media and control the flow of information both in and out of the country (De Lange 1998: 148-9).
In the pre-World War II period and throughout World War II, the press was used as a propaganda tool by the Japanese government. In 1937, the "National Spiritual Mobilization Movement" (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undō) was launched, focusing on state ideology and worship of the emperor. Writers and editors were invited to the Cabinet Information Division for "cordial meetings" (kondankai) where they were encouraged to play an active role in the movement. Even with these controls, the total number of periodicals increased from 813 dailies and 3,980 total papers in 1918 to 1,330 dailies and 11,118 total papers in 1932 (Kasza 1993: 32).
In addition to the press, radio was also a well-established means of disseminating common knowledge in the prewar and wartime period. Between 1926, when the national radio monopoly Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) was created, and 1932, the number of NHK branch stations increased from three to nineteen and the number of radios increased from 361,066 to over 1.4 million. The entire broadcast structure in Japan was controlled extensively by NHK. Pre-broadcast censorship was imposed in 1924 and remained in place until the Allied occupation. Political criticism was forbidden – governments could broadcast policy but no opposing views were allowed. An intricate set of telephones and telegraph machinery was put in place connecting each individual regional Ministry to the Communications Ministry so that controls on radio could be implemented quickly and efficiently (Kasza 1993: 88-91).
Perhaps the best example of broadcasting as a means of common knowledge dissemination is the first radio message directly from Emperor Hirohito to the Japanese populace on August 15, 1945, to announce that Japan had lost the war. Millions of Japanese citizens gathered around radios to hear the address and the message was simultaneously broadcast to those Japanese overseas by short-wave radio. Radio announcers quickly summarized the address in everyday language so that all could comprehend. Newspapers rushed to print special editions incorporating the text of the emperor’s message and commentary (Dower 1999: 34-6).
Similar to the case of Japanese cinema, the U.S. realized the power of media and radio as a means of common knowledge in Japan, and they invested resources during the war to understand both the magnitude and operation of these mechanisms. In 1944, a subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee analyzed strategies for dealing with Japanese mass media after the war. The resulting paper from that investigation, "Control of the Media of Public Information and Expression in Japan" suggested that all media activities should initially be suspended and brought under the control of the military. These recommendations were never realized. At the Potsdam conference, the form of occupation agreed upon was to undertake and administer policies through the office of the Japanese government. The mass media, in this context, was to support the execution of occupation policies.
Soon after the occupation began, McArthur issued a Press Code consisting of ten Articles outlining a free press. Among the directives was to publish truthful news and refrain from publishing news that would disturb the public order or cause distrust. It also stipulated that the promotion of the aims of the reconstruction would require "minimum control and censorship" of the press, radio and film (De Lange 1998: 167-9; Dower 1999: 75, 406-7). The implementation and enforcement of these directives fell under the control of the CIE and CCD. Censorship by the occupying forces occurred from September 1945 through September 1949 and continued in reduced form until Japan achieved its sovereignty. The indigenous populace was able to engage in media activities but all articles were to be reviewed by the occupying forces prior to publication to ensure that they met the requirements set forth in the Press Code. By the third year of occupation, while censoring still occurred, the major papers had developed a sense of what they could and could not publish to the point where official censorship was minimal (Brines 1948: 246-249). The CIE also controlled the distribution network of papers which served as an extra check on the information which was distributed.
Over this four-year period, the censorship examiners reviewed approximately 26,000 issues of newspapers, 3,800 news-agency publications, 23,000 radio transcripts, 5,700 printed bulletins, 4,000 magazine issues, and 1,800 books and pamphlets (Dower 1999: 407). Occupation control of the media also involved the purging of members of the press – a total of 350 were banned from the media (De Lange 1998: 168). The aim of these purges was to ensure that spoilers were prevented from utilizing mechanisms for the distribution of common knowledge for aims contradictory to those of the reconstruction.
The press grew rapidly even with the censorship framework in place. By 1948, there were 126 papers throughout the country. The top paper in Tokyo had a daily circulation of 1.5 million - 18.7 per 1,000 citizens. Total circulation of all newspaper was 18 million – the equivalent of 224.7 per 1,000 citizens or one copy per 4.5 people. This number increased steadily and by December 1949, total daily newspaper circulation in Japan was approximately 27.9 million copies a day – one copy per 2.9 people. Magazines covering a wide range of topics supplemented daily newspapers. By the end of 1949, the total circulation of non-daily periodicals was approximately 55 million or one paper per 1.5 people (Brines 1948: 249; Lewe van Aduard 1954: 39-40).
On April 28, 1952, the Peace Treaty went into effect and the Allied occupation formally ended. With the departure of the occupying forces, all the regulations previously enforced by the Allies via the Press Code ended. The centrally controlled distribution of newspapers also came to an end. Clearly, censorship of the media played a role in the reconstruction of Japan. However, the occupiers maintained the indigenous nature of the media industry. As such, it served as an effective mechanism for generating common knowledge during the reconstruction period.
4. Conclusion: Lessons for the Present and FutureThe analysis put forth here provides some implications for current and future reconstruction efforts. The most obvious implication is that occupying forces should make it a goal to identify pre-conflict mechanisms for developing and transmitting common knowledge. Further, they should attempt to maintain the indigenous nature of these cultural products because they can serve as a reference point to generate change. As discussed at the outset of this paper, cultural products play an important role as a source of knowledge, norms and beliefs. As Petro notes, the acceptance of new institutions can be facilitated by "…placing new institutions within the context of traditional cultural values, with the help of appropriate symbols" (2004: 202).
Given this, it is important to note that the activities undertaken by occupiers are ultimately constrained by the existing culture and cultural products in post-conflict countries. For instance, Germany and Japan had reached a relatively high level of development prior to the U.S. occupation. This development meant that these countries had some industrialized cultural products – such as cinema and media – with a widespread reach. Lesser-developed countries may not have industrialized cultural products like those present in Germany and Japan. These countries will still have a distinct culture and cultural products – ceremonies, rituals, art, etc. – but they generally will not be conducive to the types of institutions that occupiers wish to establish.
Stated differently, successful reconstruction efforts require certain institutional prerequisites which serve as a foundation for formally reconstructed institutions (see Coyne 2005, 2006). In Germany and Japan, it was a coincidence that the preexisting formal and informal institutions aligned, to a large extent, with the goals of the occupiers. This is not the case in more recent efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq where there is a disjoint between existing institutions and what occupiers hope to accomplish.
Further, it is not clear that political agents have the know-how to shape culture as they see fit. As Fukuyama indicates, cultural forces change "the most slowly of all." This has important implications because it places liberal democracy "safely beyond the reach of institutional solutions and hence public policy" (1995: 7-9). Indeed, while public policy cannot effectively create culture, it can destroy or distort culture and have the perverse effect of increasing social tensions. This lack of knowledge is good reason to err on the side of restraint when considering foreign occupation as a means of generating change.
Yet another implication deals with the issue of censorship. As the case studies of German and Japan media and cinema indicated, censorship took place in both the prewar and occupation periods. With advances in technological capabilities (i.e., Internet, satellite television and radio, etc.) available at decreasing costs, it is now possible to receive news and information from around the world. This will make it increasingly difficult for occupiers to censor news and information in conflict-torn countries. For instance, some Afghan citizens have purchased homemade satellite dishes, constructed from flattened paint cans, and are able to receive hundreds of channels from around the world. Where the populace is able to receive external information in addition to that provided by the occupying forces, attempts to control content by the occupying forces will serve to discredit their efforts.
Finally, given the unique circumstances in Germany and Japan, as well as the limited knowledge of policymakers regarding effective cultural change, alternatives to military occupation must be considered. For instance, an argument can be made that the U.S. should adopt a position of principled non-intervention coupled with a commitment to free trade in goods, services and cultural products (see Boettke and Coyne 2006). A commitment to cross-cultural trade would allow the West to pursue some notion of cosmopolitanism whereby individuals are "citizens of the world" (see Appiah 2006).
The essence of the cosmopolitan ideal is that individuals need to develop habits of coexistence with others at the personal, local, national and international levels. The philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) emphasizes that cosmopolitanism entails an ongoing conversation with both neighbors and strangers. As such, it advances the possibility of achieving mutual understanding between individuals who hold different worldviews and adhere to different moral systems. At the same time, cosmopolitanism recognizes the real possibility that consensus on a single worldview may not be reached. Such a possibility does not necessarily lead to conflict. Instead, it can result in a cooperative decision to "agree to disagree."
A commitment to free trade can be seen as a means of merging cultures and finding a common middle ground. In other words, trade is a means of engaging in an ongoing conversation and pursuing the cosmopolitan ideal. Through cultural trade, individuals in different countries will tend to share, or at a minimum, become aware of, common cultural products (see Cowen 2002: 17-18).